

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Politics, Groups, and Identities

ISSN: 2156-5503 (Print) 2156-5511 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpgi20

Refusing to know a woman's place: the causes and consequences of rejecting stereotypes of women politicians in the Americas

Amy Erica Smith, Katherine Warming & Valerie M. Hennings

To cite this article: Amy Erica Smith, Katherine Warming & Valerie M. Hennings (2016): Refusing to know a woman's place: the causes and consequences of rejecting stereotypes of women politicians in the Americas, Politics, Groups, and Identities

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2016.1198707

Published online: 21 Jun 2016.

POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2016.1198707

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Refusing to know a woman's place: the causes and consequences of rejecting stereotypes of women politicians in the Americas[†]

Amy Erica Smith[a], Katherine Warming[a] and Valerie M. Hennings[b]

[a]Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA; [b]Department of Political Science, Morningside College, Sioux City, IA, USA

ABSTRACT

What are the sources and effects of gendered leadership stereotypes for women's representation? We explore the role of stereotypes in shaping public attitudes toward women's representation using AmericasBarometer survey data from 25 countries. We report three key results. First, the modal respondent in almost every country rejects gendered leadership stereotypes, affirming that women and men leaders are equally qualified on corruption and the economy. This holds even after we attempt to account for social desirability bias. Second, there are significant individual- and country-level *determinants* of stereotyping. In countries with higher women's representation and labor force participation but without gender quotas, citizens are more likely to choose pro-female and neutral responses over pro-male stereotypes. At the individual level, those rejecting stereotypes are less authoritarian, more supportive of labor market equality, and more leftist than those reporting pro-female stereotypes. Third, the *consequences* for representation vary by partisanship and country context. Pro-female leadership stereotypes boost support for women presidential candidates and for legislative gender quotas, but they matter *less* among copartisans of women candidates, and they matter *more* when women candidates are viable but gendered outsiders. Those rejecting leadership stereotypes altogether are less supportive of quotas.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 29 May 2015
Accepted 3 June 2016

KEYWORDS
Gender stereotypes; women's representation; public opinion; gender quotas; Latin American politics

What are the nature and consequences of gendered leadership stereotypes in developing democracies? We address this question in the case of the Americas, where the number of women elected to presidential office has risen dramatically in the past decade, yet women remain substantially underrepresented at all levels. Growing bodies of work examine the institutional causes and policy consequences of women's representation in Latin America; at the mass level, scholars examine public opinion toward women leaders in the abstract,

CONTACT Amy Erica Smith aesmith2@iastate.edu Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA

[†]A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. LeeAnn Banaszak, Tessa Ditonto, Jana Morgan, Dave Peterson, and Robert Urbatsch provided very helpful feedback. The underlying replication code for this paper can be accessed at: http://amyericasmith.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Smith-Warming-Hennings-Replication-Code.zip. The data can be accessed from the AmericasBarometer, www.americasbarometer.org

and how candidate gender affects vote choice. Yet, the connection from mass attitudes such as stereotypes to women's representation in the region has yet to be addressed.

Scholars of the US show that gendered leadership stereotypes remain prevalent but are declining, and in recent elections only indirectly affect vote choice; some suggest they do not matter at all (Bauer 2015a, 2015b; Brooks 2013; Ditonto, Hamilton, and Redlawsk 2014; Dolan 2014; Dolan and Lynch 2015). We analyze 2012 public opinion data to understand citizens' stereotypes of the political capabilities of men and women politicians. We make two advances over prior work. First, we examine the extent to which developing democracies exhibit similar gendered leadership stereotypes as in the US. There are reasons to expect differences. For instance, the Americas contain a great range in levels of development, and development is associated feminist attitudes more generally (e.g., Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Morgan and Buice 2013; Paxton and Hughes 2007). Second, we distinguish theoretically and empirically between rejecting stereotypes and holding *both* pro-female and pro-male stereotypes.

We then use the same public opinion data to examine the determinants and consequences of stereotypes supporting women leaders and of refusal to stereotype. Stereotypes on economic leadership vary by a country's level of women's legislative representation and workforce participation, and by whether countries have gender quota laws. At the individual level, leftists and non-authoritarians are more likely to say both sexes are equal than to give pro-female responses.

Turning to consequences, we assess how stereotypes are associated with two public opinion outcome variables: self-reported voting for women presidential candidates and support for legislative gender quotas, a policy tool increasingly adopted across the Western Hemisphere. Results indicate pro-female stereotypes are associated with support for gender quotas and with saying one voted for women candidates. However, those saying men and women are equally competent are less supportive of gender quotas than the ambivalent.

Beyond varying levels of development, the Americas also present a wide range of party systems and levels of women's representation. This variation allows us to contextualize conclusions regarding stereotypes and women's representation heretofore based solely on the US. We find that stereotypes are *not* associated with voting for women among copartisans of women candidates. Moreover, gendered leadership stereotypes appear to matter only in elections with viable women candidates whose principal competitors are all male.

Gender stereotypes of leaders in the Americas: causes and consequences

The return to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean beginning in the 1970s coincided with a gradual rise in women's representation (Jalalzai 2016; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In legislatures, proportional representation and gender quotas have contributed to this rise (dos Santos and Wylie, Forthcoming; Hinojosa 2012; Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012; Jones 2009; Krook 2009; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In presidencies, many women elected have been spouses of former presidents or had charismatic male patrons (Jalalzai 2016; Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015; Ríos-Tobar 2008). We know less about the impact of public opinion on representation; scholars present conflicting evidence on gendered leadership preferences in the Americas (Aguilar, Cunow, and Desposato 2015; Batista Pereira 2015; Morgan 2015; Morgan and Buice 2013; Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014). We have yet to understand the role of stereotypes.

The nature and determinants of gendered leadership stereotypes

We define stereotypes as culturally learned and shared "knowledge … associated with a group of people" (Moskowitz and Li 2011, 103). We are concerned with such "knowledge" of men's and women's political leadership abilities, which may differ from knowledge of other gendered roles (Eagly and Karau 2002; Schneider and Bos 2014). A rich literature in the US developed over several decades documenting gendered leadership stereotypes; US citizens tend to associate women candidates with "feminine" traits and policy areas, and to link them to the Democratic Party (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Diamond 1977; Dolan 2004; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister 2011; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1996; Koch 2000; Lawless 2004; McDermott 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2003; Sapiro 1983; Winter 2010). Yet stereotypes are undeniably changing in the US. Dolan and Lynch observe that "the American public is more supportive of a role for women in political life today than it has ever been," and that only relatively small minorities today endorse statements such as that men are better suited emotionally for politics (2015, 112). Moreover, citizens express traditional stereotypes of women leaders to a much lesser extent than of women generally (Schneider and Bos 2014). These new results suggest that while gendered leadership stereotypes still exist, their expression and effects may be subtler than just a few decades ago.

Have gendered leadership stereotypes gradually changed in other democracies, as in the US? Women's public roles have changed dramatically in the past four decades across the North and South America. As citizens have become accustomed to women in the workplace and public office and as generational replacement has brought new cohorts of adults socialized in non-traditional roles, attitudes may have adjusted across many countries in the Americas. Diekman et al. (2005) compare dynamic gender stereotypes in the US, Chile, and Brazil; they find that in all three countries citizens believe women are becoming increasingly masculine in personality, cognitive, and physical traits, and are converging toward the mean traits of men. Hence, we have reason to expect that citizens may also increasingly say they believe there is little difference between women and men politicians.

Our first goal is thus descriptive: to understand the extent to which citizens in developing country contexts report gendered leadership stereotypes. We distinguish between citizens who reject positive and negative statements about either sex, and those who hold counter-traditional stereotypes: for instance, that women leaders are better than men on the economy.

Our second goal is to understand the *determinants* of stereotypes. At the country level, we examine the effects of levels of human development, women's representation, women's labor force participation, and of legislative gender quotas. First, the "developmental theory" of the gender gap posits that as human development rises, increasing postmaterialism boosts support for women's leadership (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Second, women's entry into office may affect women's representation long term by raising support for women leaders (e.g., Bhavnani 2009; Kerevel and Atkeson 2015). However, gender quotas can heighten stereotypes by implying that women candidates need special preferences (Bos 2015; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Fourth, rising female labor force participation can change perceptions of women's leadership capabilities. We hypothesize:

H1. As human development, women's legislative representation, and women's labor force participation rise, both positive stereotypes of women leaders and rejection of stereotypes will rise, compared to pro-male stereotypes. Controlling for legislative representation, in countries with gender quotas, both pro-female leadership stereotypes and neutrality will drop, compared to pro-male stereotypes.

At the individual level, who expresses either neutral views of women leaders or pro-female stereotypes? First we examine gender. Those in positions of relative power are more likely to stereotype the less powerful; women may tend to report both neutral and pro-female stereotypes due to gender affinity (Bauer 2015a; Dépret and Fiske 1993; Fiske 1993; Fulton 2014). Education may reduce both positive and negative stereotypes, as stereotyping can be considered a heuristic employed more frequently by those with limited cognitive and attentional resources (Bauer 2015a; Sherman, Macrae, and Bodenhausen 2000). Also, education can socialize citizens into changing gendered leadership norms (Hietanen and Pick 2015 Inglehart and Norris 2003; Morgan and Buice 2013). In addition, age might matter, as younger people are also more likely to have been socialized in a world with non-traditional gender roles (Fullerton and Stern 2010). Next, marriage may foster traditional attitudes, leading to greater stereotyping, and in particular more pro-male stereotyping (Hayes 1993). Fifth, we control for household wealth and skin color.

Turning to attitudes, we hypothesize that authoritarians – those endorsing hierarchical family structures – will endorse gendered leadership stereotypes, especially pro-male ones (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Schaller et al. 1995). Leftists and committed democrats might tend to choose egalitarian responses due to associations among equality, leftism, and democracy (Feldman 1988; Haidt 2012). However, leftists' historical support for women's representation might be driven instead by *pro-female* stereotypes (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Those rejecting traditional gender roles in the workforce may also reject pro-male leadership stereotypes (Alexander and Andersen 1993, 541; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Finally, those dissatisfied with the political system may support women political leaders, perceiving them as outsiders (Brown, Diekman, and Schneider 2011; Morgan and Buice 2013).

H2. Women, those with more education, youth, the unmarried, leftists, non-authoritarians, and those who support democracy will all be more likely to endorse neutrality, compared to positive and negative stereotypes of women leaders.
H3. Women, those with more education, youth, the unmarried, leftists, those with general feminist attitudes, and those dissatisfied with the political system will be more likely to endorse pro-female than pro-male stereotypes.

The consequences of gendered leadership stereotypes

Our third goal is to understand the *consequences* of leadership stereotypes for attitudes toward gender quotas and for presidential voting. Quotas have been adopted across the Americas, most recently in Bolivia (2010), Colombia (2011), El Salvador (2013), Nicaragua (2015), and Chile (to be implemented in 2017). But does *rejecting stereotypes* or *endorsing pro-female stereotypes* more effectively boost such support? We hypothesize that those stating there are no differences between men and women leaders – whether they actually believe there is no difference, or refuse to acknowledge differences they privately believe

exist – will be less likely to support measures addressing structural inequalities, including legislative quotas. As the US struggle for racial equality has shown, abstract belief in equality can lead citizens to oppose measures perceived as favoritism, even when intended to redress historical disadvantages (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000; see also Bos 2015 on gender quotas and egalitarianism). Hence, we expect that those rejecting both positive and negative stereotypes will be less supportive of gender quotas, but will be likely to vote for individual women candidates.

What about those with *pro-female* leadership stereotypes? Some scholars argue that gendered stereotypes no longer affect vote choice in the US, in part overwhelmed by partisanship (Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; Dolan and Lynch 2015). Others instead hold that the effect is indirect, as politicians' gender shapes communication and information-gathering strategies (Bauer 2015a, 2015b; Ditonto, Hamilton, and Redlawsk 2014; Fridkin and Kenney 2014). Women politicians in the US may now be evaluated primarily based on their *political* roles and leadership stereotypes on "masculine" issues, rather than based on feminine stereotypes (Bauer 2015a; Brooks 2013; Dolan 2010; Fulton 2012, 2014; Schneider 2014; Schneider and Bos 2014).

To what extent are findings about the impact of gender stereotypes in the US applicable across North and South America? The range of institutional and competitive landscapes in the Americas provides an opportunity to examine how the effects of stereotypes on the vote vary across contexts. Gender stereotypes might matter more for vote choices in the region's third wave "delegative democracies," characterized by voter deference to charismatic, personalist leaders (O'Donnell 1994). Voters in such countries are likely to reward stereotypically masculine characteristics.

The effects of gendered leadership stereotypes could also vary from country to country. First, levels of partisanship vary greatly across the region, and gendered leadership stereotypes appear to matter more when partisanship matters less. In the AmericasBarometer data used here, the percentage of the population identifying with a political party varies from about 13% in Guatemala to 63% in the Dominican Republic; the US is tied with the Dominican Republic for highest levels of partisanship in the hemisphere. Second, given multipartism, the competitive scenarios facing women candidates across the Americas vary greatly. In some races, women candidates represent minor parties with few real chances of winning, and in others they are viable. In some races a single woman runs, and in others there are multiple women. We expect that gendered leadership stereotypes will be activated more strongly when women candidates are viable, but when there is a single viable female candidate. When multiple viable women are on the ballot, gender may become less salient in voters' evaluations of candidates. We hypothesize:

H4. Those who reject stereotypes will be reluctant to support gender quotas, but will tend to support women candidates. Those with pro-female stereotypes will support both gender quotas and female candidates.
H5. The effects of pro-female stereotypes will be stronger for non-partisans and in races in which there is a single viable woman.

Data and methods

Our study is based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer, in which over 41,000 citizens were interviewed in 26 countries (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). In 24 countries,

the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face interviews in respondents' homes, while it was conducted using a web interface in the US and Canada (Canada is excluded due to missing data, and only descriptive data on stereotypes are available in the US). Outside these two countries, the survey was based on a common sample design, involving a multi-stage, stratified probability sample (with household-level quotas) of approximately 1500 individuals per country. Coefficients and standard errors have been adjusted to take into account the complex sample design (Kish 1965).

These countries present great diversity in women's incorporation into politics. The US was the first to grant women suffrage, in 1920. In the ensuing decades suffrage was granted in every country; finally in 1967 voting became compulsory for Ecuadoran women, after previously being compulsory only for men (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015). At the elite level, 18 countries have legislated candidate quotas, and 10 have voluntary party quotas (Quota Project 2013). As of 2015, 6 had had woman as prime minister and 11 as president (women had filled both positions in Guyana and Haiti; see Hawkesworth 2012; Jalalzai 2008). In 2015, legislatures ranged from 3–4% female in Belize and Haiti to 42–53% in Ecuador and Bolivia.

In 2012, the AmericasBarometer included two questions regarding gendered leadership stereotypes: "Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?" and "If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?" (see Appendix Table A1 for frequencies). These questions were administered to half of respondents in each country.[1] When these items are used as dependent variables, they are coded so that the omitted categories are the pro-male responses. The measures have limitations, in that they do not capture the full range of gendered stereotypes that might affect attitudes toward women's leadership. First, they deal only with perceptions of *leaders*, and not perceptions of women's political capabilities in general. Second, they measure only beliefs about women's and men's relative competence in key areas of political performance; they do not address perceptions of other leader characteristics, such as ideology or personality traits. Third, they measure only attitudes with respect to stereotypically masculine traits, and exclude stereotypically feminine ones. Nonetheless, these data *do* address one important domain of stereotypes, and they provide an unrivaled opportunity to study stereotypes across a great range of countries.

We assess the association between stereotypes and two dependent variables. The first addresses support for gender quotas: "The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?" Responses ran from "Strongly Disagree" (1) to "Strongly Agree" (7). The second measures voting for a woman presidential candidate, following Morgan (2015). In each country, respondents were asked whom they had supported in the most recent presidential or parliamentary general election (in countries with two round elections, respondents were asked about the first round). In countries with a woman presidential candidate, an indicator variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted for a woman and 0 if for a man. Non-voters and parliamentary systems are excluded, since in parliamentary races votes are cast for parties rather than the likely eventual head of government.[2] After excluding countries in which fewer than 20 respondents had voted for the female candidate(s) in the most recent election, the countries analyzed are Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.

Of 46 presidential candidates coded, 13 were women, 8 of whom won over 10% of the vote (see Appendix Table A2). One (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina) was an incumbent, and three were from the incumbent party. Fernández was reelected in 2011; Dilma Rousseff from Brazil's incumbent PT and Laura Chinchilla from Costa Rica's incumbent PLN were both elected to first terms in 2010. None of the other women was elected.[3]

Multivariate analysis includes four country-level variables: human development, women's legislative representation, women's labor force participation rate, and gender quota laws.[4] In voting models, we also control for identification with the same or a different party from the woman candidate(s), based on a question that asks simply "Do you identify with a political party?" In many countries of the Americas, partisanship is low, and affiliations unstable; partisanship is often endogenous to vote choice, especially when both are reported months or years after the election. Hence, controlling for partisanship runs the risk of overcorrecting for a downstream effect of the vote. Only about 35% of our sample reports partisan affiliation, split approximately evenly between copartisans and out-partisans of the woman candidate(s).

We control for other individual characteristics. *Support for women's labor participation* is measured by asking, "Some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?" Responses were originally from 1 to 7; they are reverse coded so that higher values represent more egalitarian responses and converted to a 0–1 scale. This item is a classic measure of gender ideology (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). *Support for democracy* is the extent to which respondents agree that "democracy may have problems, but it's better than the alternatives"; again, responses were originally scaled 1–7 but recoded from 0 to 1. This classic from the AmericasBarometer has been validated in many studies, and is powerfully associated with political behavior in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009; Smith 2009).

Support for the political system is a 0–1 index derived from classic studies (Muller 1979). It averages responses to five questions about the respondent's country: the extent to which "courts … guarantee a fair trial"; "you respect [your country's] political institutions"; "citizens' basic rights are well protected"; "you feel proud of living under the political system"; and "you think that one should support" the system. *Leftism* is a 10 category variable, running from 0 (far right) to 1 (far left).[5] Measurement of *authoritarianism* follows Hetherington and Weiler (2009). Respondents were asked which was more important for a child: (a) independence versus respect for adults; (b) obedience versus autonomy; and (c) creativity versus discipline. Responses of (a) respect for adults, (b) obedience, and (c) discipline each received a value of 1; their opposites 0. Volunteered answers that "both are important" received .5. The scale is the mean of responses. Across the Americas, 40.3% of respondents score a 1.0, and only 9% below 0.5.

Educational attainment is a four category ordinal variable running from 0 to 1, adjusted to each country: no formal education; primary education (1 to 6–8 years of schooling, varying by country); secondary education; and university/post-secondary education. *Age* is coded in six groups (16–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and 66+).[6] Indicator variables measure gender and marital status. *Household wealth* is coded in quintiles within each country by the AmericasBarometer (Córdova 2009); this variable has lower levels of

missing data than income. Finally, to capture race cross-nationally, interviewers surreptitiously coded *skin color* using a printed card running from 1 (very light) to 11 (very dark).

We also include an indicator for interviewer gender. Individuals may suppress stereotypic and prejudiced responses (Devine 1989; Devine et al. 2002; Krupnikov, Piston, and Bauer 2016). Citizens who actually believe one sex is superior may avoid saying so due to social desirability bias (Presser and Traugott 1992). Such citizens might choose not to answer the questions; they might give neutral or egalitarian responses; or they might actually endorse stereotypes contrary to private inclinations. While controlling for the sex of the interviewer does not fully address the problem, it provides some leverage on this issue. When the interviewer is male, we expect fewer respondents to give neutral and pro-female responses, and more to report pro-male stereotypes, compared to when the interviewer is female.

Results and discussion

Before evaluating our hypotheses, we examine the incidence of stereotypes. Across the Americas, a near majority rejects leadership stereotypes on both dimensions; 49% say that leaders' sex does not matter for either corruption or the economy. The US is among the countries with highest stereotype rejection, but at least half of respondents in 13 of the 25 countries rejects stereotypes on both issues (Figure 1). Examining the content of stereotypes, 31% of respondents across the Americas say men are more corrupt and only 5% say women are more corrupt. Thirteen percent say they prefer men's leadership on the economy, and 28% prefer women's leadership (see Appendix for the distribution by country). Thus, most citizens exhibit some discomfort with



Figure 1. Percent of Respondents Reporting "Both are the Same" and "It Does Not Matter" on Leadership Questions.

stereotypes, but (except in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Guatemala) those reporting stereotypes tend to favor women leaders in both performance areas.

Were respondents self-censoring? If social desirability leads citizens to overstate neutrality, the effect may be somewhat weaker with male interviewers. Bivariate analysis provides minor evidence of interviewer effects. Having a male interviewer decreases the percentages saying women are better at the economy from 29% to 26%, and it decreases neutral responses from 59% to 58%. It is not significantly associated with responses on corruption.

What leads to gendered leadership stereotypes? We had hypothesized that both positive pro-female stereotypes and rejection of stereotypes would be positively associated with a

Table 1. Hierarchical multinomial logit models: determinants of gendered leadership stereotypes in the Americas, 2012.

	Who is less corrupt?		Who is better at economy?	
	A woman	Both equal	A woman	Both equal
Individual-level determinants				
Leftism	0.008	0.132	0.106	**0.300****
	(0.158)	*(0.153)*	*(0.107)*	*(0.098)*
Support for women's labor participation	0.924***	**1.117*****	0.759***	**1.032*****
	(0.125)	*(0.120)*	*(0.085)*	*(0.078)*
Authoritarianism	0.348^	**−0.123**	−0.368**	**−0.563*****
	(0.184)	*(0.176)*	*(0.127)*	*(0.118)*
Male interviewer	−0.099	−0.055	−0.483***	**−0.342*****
	(0.093)	*(0.090)*	*(0.061)*	*(0.056)*
Support for democracy	0.620***	**0.323***	0.244*	−0.068
	(0.151)	*(0.144)*	*(0.107)*	*(0.099)*
Support for the political system	−0.291	−0.219	−0.220	−0.131
	(0.206)	*(0.199)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.126)*
Educational level	0.682***	0.700***	0.368**	0.443***
	(0.207)	*(0.200)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.126)*
Age	0.418**	0.437**	−0.037	−0.102
	(0.150)	*(0.144)*	*(0.099)*	*(0.091)*
Female	0.329***	**0.195***	0.850***	**0.475*****
	(0.091)	*(0.088)*	*(0.062)*	*(0.057)*
Married/partner	0.085	0.126	0.054	0.063
	(0.088)	*(0.085)*	*(0.060)*	*(0.055)*
Quintile of household wealth	0.027	−0.005	−0.005	0.016
	(0.032)	*(0.031)*	*(0.022)*	*(0.020)*
Skin color	−0.051*	−0.061*	−0.039*	−0.040*
	(0.026)	*(0.025)*	*(0.017)*	*(0.016)*
Country-level determinants				
Human Development Index	2.952	1.848	1.292	0.771
	(2.256)	*(1.774)*	*(1.153)*	*(1.139)*
Women in legislature	0.999	−0.832	2.178***	1.566**
	(1.590)	*(1.297)*	*(0.582)*	*(0.568)*
Gender quota laws	0.032	−0.171	−0.212	−0.445*
	(0.374)	*(0.305)*	*(0.203)*	*(0.200)*
Women in labor force	1.900	1.160	2.328*	**0.270**
	(1.906)	*(1.589)*	*(1.055)*	*(1.042)*
Number of observations	*14,092*		*13,932*	
Number of countries	*20*		*20*	
Log likelihood	*−10794.157*		*−12751.432*	

Notes: The base outcome for each model is the pro-male response (i.e., men are less corrupt and better at the economy). Coefficients in the "both equal" equations marked in **bold** are statistically significantly different from the respective coefficients in the pro-female equations at $p < .05$. Coefficients are statistically significant at ^ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Countries included in the analysis: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

country's levels of human development, women's legislative representation, and women's labor force participation, and negatively associated with gender quotas. In Table 1 we present two hierarchical multinomial logit models (Gelman and Hill 2007). As the omitted category in both models is the pro-male response, coefficients represent determinants of choosing pro-female or neutral responses relative to pro-male ones. In the "both the same" columns, coefficients in **bold font** are significantly different from those for pro-female stereotypes at $p < .05$.[7] At the country level, corruption stereotypes are not significantly associated with any variable. However, women's legislative representation boosts both pro-female economic stereotypes and neutrality. Gender quotas *decrease* neutral responses relative to pro-male ones, while women's labor force participation *increases* pro-female relative to pro-male stereotypes.

At the individual level, we had hypothesized that women, those with more education, youth, the unmarried, and leftists would all tend to endorse both neutrality and pro-female stereotypes. We also expected that non-authoritarians and supporters of democracy would tend to choose the neutral option, while those with feminist attitudes and those dissatisfied with the political system would tend to endorse pro-female stereotypes. Results indicate that those saying men and women are the same are distinct from those giving pro-female and pro-male responses in non-centrist ways. Leftists and those most supportive of women's labor market participation tend to choose the neutral option on the economy, rather than favor women's leadership. Those rejecting stereotypes are also less authoritarian; authoritarianism actually increases pro-female responses on corruption. In partial contradiction of Hypothesis 2, however, support for democracy is associated with pro-female stereotypes, not the neutral option.

Congruent with our hypotheses, education increases pro-female and neutral responses. Women are much more likely than men to report positive stereotypes of women leaders, and somewhat more likely to *reject* stereotypes. Marriage and income are unassociated with stereotypes, while older citizens are somewhat less likely to see men as corrupt, and those with darker skin somewhat more likely to choose pro-male responses. Last, confirming the bivariate analysis, the interviewer's sex affects answers on economic leadership, but not corruption.

How do attitudes affect women's representation? Do *pro-female stereotypes* or *neutrality* more effectively promote women's inclusion? We had hypothesized that both those rejecting stereotypes and those with pro-female stereotypes would be more likely to vote for women candidates, but that those rejecting stereotypes would fail to support gender quotas. In Figure 2, we present bivariate relationships between leadership stereotypes and two outcome measures. We code a single categorical variable distinguishing those who give two pro-female, two pro-male, or two neutral responses, or an ambivalent combination (pro-female-neutral, pro-male-neutral, or pro-female-pro-male). Comparing consistent pro-female to consistent pro-male respondents, support for gender quotas is one point higher on the one-to-seven scale and support for women candidates nineteen percentage points higher in the simple, bivariate analysis. Those rejecting stereotypes are significantly less supportive of gender quotas than either of the other groups, but they support women *candidates* at similar rates as those who are pro-female.

In Table 2 we present multivariate hierarchical models assessing how stereotypes are associated with support for gender quotas. Both pro-female and neutral responses on corruption are associated with higher support for gender quotas. However, respondents



Figure 2. Consequences of Stereotyping in the Americas, 2012.

saying men and women leaders perform equally on the economy support gender quotas at the same level as those saying men are better. Turning to the other independent variables, women and committed democrats are substantially more supportive of gender quotas. Controlling for other variables, however, those supporting women's equal labor force participation actually have *lower* support for legislative gender quotas. None of the country-level variables – even the actual presence of gender quota laws – is significantly associated with support for gender quotas.[8]

In Table 3, we assess determinants of self-reported vote for a woman versus a man in the eight countries with women candidates in the most recent presidential election. The first column presents a non-interactive model. Across these countries, corruption stereotypes are unassociated with prior vote choice, while pro-female stereotypes on the

Table 2. Hierarchical model: determinants of support for legislative gender quotas.

	Coefficient	Standard error
A woman is less corrupt	0.443***	0.077
Both equal on corruption	0.327***	0.077
A woman better on economy	0.375***	0.053
Both equal on economy	0.024	0.050
Support for women's labor participation	−0.273***	0.047
Authoritarianism	0.111^	0.066
Male interviewer	−0.047	0.034
Support for democracy	0.856***	0.057
Leftism	0.025	0.058
Educational level	0.044	0.074
Age	−0.078	0.054
Woman	0.309***	0.033
Married/common law married	−0.001	0.032
Quintiles of wealth	−0.006	0.012
Skin color	−0.003	0.010
Human Development Index	−0.706	2.190
Women in legislature	1.006	1.553
Gender quota laws	0.207	0.364
Constant	4.088*	1.636
Number of observations	*13,437*	
Number of countries	*20*	
R-squared	*0.0506*	

Notes: Coefficients are statistically significant at ^ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 3. Hierarchical logistic regression models: determinants of voting for women politicians.

	(1)	(2)
Women less corrupt	−0.239	−0.189
	(0.248)	(0.259)
Both equal on corruption	−0.222	−0.202
	(0.246)	(0.258)
Women better on economy	0.366*	0.383*
	(0.152)	(0.174)
Both equal on economy	0.150	0.191
	(0.143)	(0.161)
In-party supporter		2.461***
		(0.413)
Women better economy*in-party		−0.680
		(0.462)
Equal on economy*in-party		−0.192
		(0.448)
Out-party supporter		−1.256***
		(0.145)
Woman	0.355***	0.341***
	(0.087)	(0.093)
Education	−0.511*	−0.501*
	(0.202)	(0.217)
Age	−0.243	−0.340*
	(0.153)	(0.164)
Married/common law married	0.064	0.07
	(0.091)	(0.097)
Quintiles of wealth	0.003	−0.005
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Skin color	0.014	0.02
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Number of observations	*3567*	*3567*
Number of countries	*8*	*8*
Log likelihood	*−1753.30*	*−1553.78*

Notes: Models based only on Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. Coefficients are statistically significant at ^ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

economy are associated with an increased probability of voting for a woman. Those who say the genders are equal on the economy are somewhat but not significantly more likely to say they voted for a woman than those with pro-male stereotypes. In addition, women are more likely than men to support women candidates, confirming findings from Europe and the Americas (Fulton 2014; Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011; Holli and Wass 2010; Morgan 2015; Paolino 1995; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Simon and Hoyt 2008).

Do results vary from one country to another? We had hypothesized that pro-female stereotypes would more strongly affect vote choice among non-partisans and in races with a single viable woman. In eight countries, developing hierarchical models is risky, but we run analysis within each country. We find gender stereotypes are associated with vote choice *only* in Costa Rica, and weakly in Argentina.[9] In the former, the effects are quite large (see Table 4). In the latter, *neutrality* significantly raises the probability of voting for a woman, but *pro-female stereotypes* do not. So why were stereotypes associated with voting only in Costa Rica and Argentina? Recall that these are two of the three countries in which women won the presidency. In Brazil, the third country, candidate Dilma Rousseff's third place competitor was also a woman. The presence of two strong, arguably viable women candidates within one race may have reduced the salience of gendered leadership stereotypes. In Argentina and Costa Rica, stereotypes might also have been activated by quotas that led to high women's legislative representation but

Table 4. Predicted probability of voting for a woman candidate, by gendered leadership stereotypes.

	Man better at economy	Woman better	Both the same
Guatemala 2011	0.03	0.04	0.05
Costa Rica 2010	0.46	0.81	0.72
Panama 2009	0.34	0.23	0.26
Peru 2011	0.27	0.31	0.31
Paraguay 2008	0.20	0.27	0.14
Brazil 2010	0.82	0.80	0.76
Argentina 2011	0.77	0.83	0.88
Haiti 2010/2011	0.12	0.16	0.13

Note: Results are from individual-country logistic regression models.

emphasized special treatment of women candidates (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Though Brazil has gender quotas, they have been extraordinarily ineffective in that country (dos Santos and Wylie, Forthcoming). In the remaining countries, by contrast, women candidates might not have been salient enough in many voters' choice sets to activate stereotypes.

Returning to the pooled model, we hypothesize that partisanship conditions the effect of stereotypes. In weak party systems, controlling for partisanship can understate the effect of stereotypes because partisanship is often endogenous to vote choice. Still, interactive analysis provides the opportunity to verify US-based findings that gender stereotypes matter less among partisans. The second column of Table 3 indicates gender stereotypes do not matter for copartisans of the woman candidate, while they *do* affect gendered voting among independents and out-party supporters.[10] Among independents, the probability of voting for a woman is .29 for those who believe male leaders are better on the economy, but .37 and .33 for those with pro-female and neutral views. Effects among out-partisans are larger than among non-partisans, though differences are not statistically significant. Among these countries, levels of partisanship vary from 18% (in Peru) to 58% (in Paraguay); in the broader sample, the US and the Dominican Republic are tied for the highest partisanship, at 63%. Thus, varying party systems could lead to variation in the impact of stereotypes.

Conclusion

To what extent do citizens of the Americas hold gendered leadership stereotypes, and what are the consequences for representation? We report three sets of findings. First, most citizens reject gendered leadership stereotypes, at least on some indicators. Of those who *do* accept stereotypes, the majority support women's leadership, though we cannot fully rule out social desirability bias. These data do not measure the full range of gendered leadership stereotypes, but they do represent a great range of countries. We find substantial cross-national variation in stereotyping; rejection of stereotypes is most pronounced in the US and Panama, and least in the Dominican Republic.

Second, stereotypes vary systematically by women's labor force participation, legislative representation, and gender quota laws. At the individual level, those saying "both are the same" are more leftist, more likely to oppose labor market preferences for men, and less authoritarian than those saying women leaders are superior. Meanwhile, women and committed democrats tend to choose pro-female over neutral responses.

Third, we examine the consequences of gendered leadership stereotypes. In pooled analysis, pro-female stereotypes boost support for gender quotas, but rejecting stereotypes is associated with lower support for quotas. Both pro-female *and* neutral responses are associated with voting for women candidates when ones are available. However, the association between stereotypes and voting for women varies cross-nationally. It may be highest when women candidates are viable and salient, yet are positioned as gendered outsiders. Relatively low partisanship can also exacerbate the impact of gendered leadership stereotypes.

What are the lessons for institutional designers? Previous studies identify a combination of legislative institutions highly effective in boosting women's representation: closed list proportional representation, gender quotas, and strong parties. Yet the present study highlights concerns. Gender quotas can exacerbate stereotypic thinking about women leaders, while support for gender quotas may be inhibited by norms of equality. Thus, a challenge faces proponents of gender quotas: to frame quotas to appeal to the majority of citizens who support – at least in principle – gender equality in political leadership.

And what about party strategies? In only 8 of the 16 presidential systems studied did women candidates receive more than tiny vote shares. Even in those eight countries, male candidates greatly outnumbered women, and less than half of citizens who preferred women leaders on both issues voted for women candidates. Promoting women's leadership, then, requires attention to elite recruitment. Major parties considering nominating women may find the experiences of major women presidential candidates in the Americas instructive. It is telling that gendered stereotypes have affected voting for women only in certain conditions, and that even in those cases, women won. Women candidates may find it especially helpful to seek advantages on issues traditionally viewed as men's strengths (e.g., Schneider 2014). Thus, a lesson from studies in the US also applies to presidential politics across the hemisphere: when women run, they can win.

Notes

1. The questions were omitted entirely in Canada, which consequently is excluded from all analysis.
2. The only parliamentary countries with women party heads were Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. The presidential elections with women candidates that are excluded are Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia; the woman candidates are Patricia Mercado, from Mexico's Social Democratic and Peasant Alternative Party (0.4% of reported votes); Noemí Sanín, from Colombia's Conservative Party (1.6%); Martha Roldos Bucaram, from Ecuador's Ethics and Democracy Network (1.5%) and Melba Jacome, from Ecuador's Fertile Earth Movement (0.3%); and Ana María Flores, from Bolivia's Movement for Patriotic Social Unity (0.1%).
3. One might wonder about the interaction between gender and incumbency (e.g., Shair-Rosenfield 2012; Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 2014). In the 17 presidential elections here (including US 2008), it is difficult to draw inferences on this issue. Among the eight incumbent candidates, the lone woman and six of the seven men were reelected. Among non-incumbents from the incumbent party, two of the five men and two of the four women were elected.
4. *Human development* is from the UNDP Human Development Index (2012). *Labor force participation* is from the World Bank (2012), and is rescaled as a proportion (i.e., to run from 0 to 1): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS. *Women in the legislature* is

from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (March 2012), and is also rescaled as a proportion: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310312.htm. Gender quotas are coded by the Quota Project, http://www.quotaproject.org.

5. Non-response on ideology is relatively high (19%). Personal and contextual variables affect non-response (Ames and Smith 2010; Harbers, de Vries, and Steenbergen 2013; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). To include non-respondents, we assign them a value of 5.5 (the midpoint). Results are similar if we exclude them or simply use dummy variables for the scale endpoints.
6. Sixteen and seventeen-year-olds were included only in countries where they are considered of majority age and have voting rights.
7. The US, Belize, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Suriname are excluded due to missing data. Countries included in each analysis are listed in table notes.
8. The country-level coefficients remain statistically insignificant when entered individually.
9. Standard errors may be inflated due to small samples, yet coefficients are also small in most countries.
10. This interactive effect is also evident in Costa Rica.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. The data utilized here are publicly available at http:www.lapopsurveys.org.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

References

Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, and Scott Desposato. 2015. "Choice Sets, Gender, and Candidate Choice in Brazil." *Electoral Studies* 39: 230–242.

Alexander, Deborah, and Kristi Andersen. 1993. "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits." *Political Research Quarterly* 46 (3): 527–545.

Ames, Barry, and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. "Knowing Left from Right: Ideological Identification in Brazil, 2002–2006." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3): 3–38.

Banaszak, Lee Ann, and Eric Plutzer. 1993. "Contextual Determinants of Feminist Attitudes: National and Subnational Influences in Western Europe." *American Political Science Review* 87 (1): 145–157.

Batista Pereira, Frederico. 2015. "Electoral Rules and Aversive Sexism: When Does Voter Bias Affect Female Candidates?" Unpublished manuscript.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2015a. "Who Stereotypes Female Candidates? Identifying Individual Differences in Feminine Stereotype Reliance." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3 (1): 94–110.

Bauer, Nichole M. 2015b. "Emotional, Sensitive, and Unfit for Office? Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female Candidates." *Political Psychology* 36 (6): 691–708.

Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* 103 (1): 23–35.

Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bos, Angela L. 2015. "The Unintended Effects of Political Party Affirmative Action Policies on Female Candidates' Nomination Chances." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3 (1): 73–93.

Brooks, Deborah. 2013. *He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brown, Elizabeth R., Amanda B. Diekman, and Monica C. Schneider. 2011. "A Change Will Do Us Good: Threats Diminish Typical Preferences for Male Leaders." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 37 (7): 930–941.
Córdova, Abby. 2009. *Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators. AmericasBarometer Insights*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.
Dépret, Eric, and Susan T. Fiske. 1993. "Social Cognition and Power: Some Cognitive Consequences of Social Structure as a Source of Control Deprivation." In *Control Motivation and Social Cognition*, edited by Gifford Weary, Faith Gleicher, and Kerry L. Marsh, 176–202. New York: Springer.
Devine, Patricia G. 1989. "Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56 (1): 5–18.
Devine, Patricia G., E. Ashby, David M. Amodio, Eddie Harmon-Jones, and Stephanie L. Vance. 2002. "The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond without Prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82 (5): 835–848.
Diamond, Irene. 1977. *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Diekman, Amanda B., Alice H. Eagly, Antonio Mladinic, and Maria Cristina Ferreira. 2005. "Dynamic Stereotypes about Women and Men in Latin America and the United States." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36 (2): 209–226.
Ditonto, Tessa, Allison Hamilton, and David Redlawsk. 2014. "Gender Stereotypes, Information Search, and Voting Behavior in Political Campaigns." *Political Behavior* 36 (2): 335–358.
Dolan, Kathleen. 2004. *Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Dolan, Kathleen. 2010. "The Impact of Gender Stereotypes Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates." *Political Behavior* 32 (1): 69–88.
Dolan, Kathleen. 2014. *When Does Gender Matter?* New York: Oxford University Press.
Dolan, Kathleen, and Timothy Lynch. 2015. "Making the Connection? Attitudes about Women in Politics and Voting for Women Candidates." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3 (1): 111–132.
dos Santos, Pedro G., and Kristin Wylie. Forthcoming. "A Law on Paper Only: Electoral Rules, Parties, and the Persistent Underrepresentation of Women in Brazilian Legislatures." *Politics & Gender*.
Eagly, Alice H., and Steven J. Karau. 2002. "Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders." *Psychological Review* 109 (3): 573–598.
Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (2): 416–440.
Fiske, Susan T. 1993. "Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping." *The American Psychologist* 48 (6): 621–628.
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2008. "Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina." *Politics & Gender* 4 (3): 393–425.
Fridkin, Kim L., and Patrick J. Kenney. 2014. *The Changing Face of Representation: The Gender of U.S. Senators and Constituent Communications*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Fullerton, Andrew S., and Michael J. Stern. 2010. "Explaining the Persistence and Eventual Decline of the Gender Gap in Voter Registration and Turnout in the American South, 1956–1980." *Social Science History* 34 (2): 129–169.
Fulton, Sarah. 2012. "Running Backwards and in High Heels: The Gendered Quality Gap and Incumbent Electoral Success." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (2): 303–314.
Fulton, Sarah. 2014. "When Gender Matters: Macro-Dynamics and Micro-Mechanisms." *Political Behavior* 36 (3): 605–630.
Gelman, Andrew, and Jennifer Hill. 2007. *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goodyear-Grant, Elizabeth, and Julie Croskill. 2011. "Gender Affinity Effects in Vote Choice in Westminster Systems: Assessing 'Flexible' Voters in Canada." *Politics & Gender* 7 (2): 223–250.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Harbers, Imke, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2013. "Attitude Variability Among Latin American Publics: How Party System Structuration Affects Left/Right Ideology." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (8): 946–967.
Hawkesworth, Mary. 2012. *Political Worlds of Women: Activism, Advocacy, and Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Hayes, Bernadette C. 1993. "Partisanship and Political Attitudes: Is There a Marriage Gap?" *Australian Journal of Political Science* 28 (2): 242–257.
Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hietanen, Anna-Emilia, and Susan Pick. 2015. "Gender Stereotypes, Sexuality, and Culture in Mexico." In *Psychology of Gender Through the Lens of Culture*, edited by Saba Safdar, and Natasza Kosakowska-Berezecka, 285–305. Cham: Springer International.
Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. *Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Hinojosa, Magda, and Susan Franceschet. 2012. "Separate but Not Equal: The Effects of Municipal Electoral Reform on Female Representation in Chile." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (4): 758–770.
Holli, Anne Maria, and Hanna Wass. 2010. "Gender-Based Voting in the Parliamentary Elections of 2007 in Finland." *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (5): 598–630.
Holman, Mirya R., Jennifer L. Merolla, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2011. "Sex, Stereotypes, and Security: A Study of the Effects of Terrorist Threat on Assessments of Female Leadership." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 32 (3): 173–192.
Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1): 119–147.
Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton. 2015. "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas." *International Studies Quarterly*. doi:10.1111/isqu.12190.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2012. *Women in Politics: 2012*. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/pdf/publications/wmnmap12_en-.pdf.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2015. *Women's Suffrage*. June. http://www.ipu.org.
Jalalzai, Farida. 2008. "Women Rule: Shattering the Executive Glass Ceiling." *Politics & Gender* 4 (2): 1–27.
Jalalzai, Farida. 2016. *Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?* New York: Routledge.
Jalalzai, Farida, and Pedro G. dos Santos. 2015. "The Dilma Effect? Women's Representation under Dilma Rousseff's Presidency." *Politics & Gender* 11 (1): 117–145.
Jones, Mark P. 2009. "Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Evidence from the Latin American Vanguard." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (1): 56–81.
Kahn, Kim Fridkin. 1996. *The Political Consequences of Being a Woman: How Stereotypes Influence the Conduct and Consequences of Political Campaigns*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78 (1): 235–268.
Kerevel, Yann P., and Lonna Rae Atkeson. 2015. "Reducing Stereotypes of Female Political Leaders in Mexico." *Political Research Quarterly* 68 (4): 732–744.
Kish, Leslie. 1965. *Survey Sampling*. New York: Wiley.
Koch, Jeffrey. 2000. "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?" *The Journal of Politics* 62: 414–429.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Krupnikov, Yanna, Spencer Piston, and Nichole M. Bauer. 2016. "Saving Face: Identifying Voter Responses to Black Candidates and Female Candidates." *Political Psychology* 37 (2): 253–273.
Lawless, Jennifer. 2004. "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotypes in the Post-September 11th Era." *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (3): 479–490.
McAllister, Ian, and Donley T. Studlar. 2002. "Electoral Systems and Women's Representation: A Long-Term Perspective." *Representation* 39 (1): 3–14.
McDermott, Monika L. 1998. "Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 51 (4): 895–918.
Morgan, Jana. 2015. "Gender and the Latin American Voter." In *The Latin American Voter*, edited by Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew Singer, and Elizabeth Zechmeister, 143–167. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Morgan, Jana, and Melissa Buice. 2013. "Latin American Attitudes Toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics." *American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 644–662.
Moskowitz, Gordon B., and Peizhong Li. 2011. "Egalitarian Goals Trigger Stereotype Inhibition: A Proactive Form of Stereotype Control." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47 (2011): 103–116.
Muller, Edward N. 1979. *Aggressive Political Participation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. "Delegative Democracy?" *Journal of Democracy* 5: 55–69.
Paolino, Phillip. 1995. "Group-Salient Issues and Group Representation: Support for Women Candidates in the 1992 Senate Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (2): 294–313.
Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. 2007. *Women, Politics, and Power: A Global Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press/Sage.
Paxton, Pamela, and Sheri Kunovich. 2003. "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology." *Social Forces* 82 (1): 87–113.
Presser, Stanley, and Michael Traugott. 1992. "Little White Lies and Social Science Models: Correlated Response Errors in a Panel Study of Voting." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56: 77–86.
Quota Project. 2013. "Global Database of Quotas for Women." International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University. http://www.quotaproject.org.
Ríos-Tobar, Marcela. 2008. "Seizing a Window of Opportunity: The Election of President Bachelet in Chile." *Politics & Gender* 4 (3): 509–519.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2003. "Political Knowledge and Gender Stereotypes." *American Politics Research* 31 (6): 575–594.
Sapiro, Virginia. 1983. *The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Schaller, Mark, Carrie Boyd, Jonathan Yohannes, and Meredith O'Brien. 1995. "The Prejudiced Personality Revisited: Personal Need for Structure and Formation of Erroneous Group Stereotypes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 68 (3): 544–555.
Schneider, Monica C. 2014. "The Effects of Gender-Bending on Candidate Evaluations." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 35 (1): 55–77.
Schneider, Monica C., and Angela L. Bos. 2014. "Measuring Stereotypes of Female Politicians." *Political Psychology* 35 (2): 245–266.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2010. *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sears, David O., P. J. Henry, and Rick Kosterman. 2000. "Egalitarian Values and Contemporary Racial Politics." In *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*, edited by David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo, 75–117. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Seligson, Mitchell A., Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, ed. 2012. *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2012: Toward Equality of Opportunity*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project.
Seltzer, Richard, Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. 1997. *Sex as a Political Variable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U.S. Elections*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah. 2012. "The Alternative Incumbency Effect: Electing Women Legislators in Indonesia." *Electoral Studies* 31 (3): 576–587.
Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah, and Magda Hinojosa. 2014. "Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender Bias in Elections? Evidence from Chile." *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (4): 837–850.
Sherman, Jeffrey W., C. Neil Macrae, and Galen V. Bodenhausen. 2000. "Attention and Stereotyping: Cognitive Constraints on the Construction of Meaningful Social Impressions." *European Review of Social Psychology* 11 (1): 145–175.
Simon, Stefanie, and Crystal L. Hoyt. 2008. "Exploring the Gender Gap in Support for a Woman for President." *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 8 (1): 157–181.
Smith, Amy Erica. 2009. "Legitimate Grievances: Preferences for Democracy, System Support, and Political Participation in Bolivia." *Latin American Research Review* 44 (3): 102–126.
Winter, Nicholas J. G. 2010. "Masculine Republicans and Feminine Democrats: Gender and Americans' Explicit and Implicit Images of the Political Parties." *Political Behavior* 32 (4): 587–618.
Zechmeister, Elizabeth, and Margarita Corral. 2013. "Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (6): 675–701.

Appendix

Table A1. Percentages choosing each response, AmericasBarometer 2012

	Which more corrupt?			Which better on economy?			
	A man	A woman	Both the same	A man	A woman	It does not matter	% supporting gender quotas
Argentina	23.3	2.7	74.0	13.4	21.0	65.6	68.4
Belize	25.9	7.7	66.4	12.2	28.2	59.6	63.3
Bolivia	37.8	3.7	58.4	14.9	36.8	48.3	61.7
Brazil	37.2	1.1	61.6	8.6	25.1	66.3	48.4
Chile	26.5	4.9	68.6	9.5	35.5	54.9	74.8
Colombia	40.6	6.4	52.9	6.7	47.4	45.9	74.0
Costa Rica	25.1	2.9	72.0	7.8	22.3	69.9	63.1
Dom. Republic	65.2	2.9	31.8	20.7	41.5	37.8	81.1
Ecuador	31.3	6.6	62.1	12.4	32.7	54.9	69.1
El Salvador	21.0	1.7	77.3	9.6	17.6	72.7	84.7
Guatemala	21.6	2.2	76.2	16.5	15.6	67.9	54.0
Guyana	29.3	17.3	53.4	27.9	19.5	52.5	66.9
Haiti	24.5	6.4	69.1	18.9	19.3	61.8	52.0
Honduras	26.8	9.6	63.6	11.7	38.2	50.1	54.9
Jamaica	32.2	2.7	65.0	13.3	21.2	65.5	50.6
Mexico	41.8	4.4	53.8	11.7	33.5	54.8	64.9
Nicaragua	36.6	6.3	57.1	13.0	29.0	58.0	72.5
Panama	20.2	9.1	70.8	9.0	19.9	71.2	56.0
Paraguay	38.5	2.1	59.4	11.5	39.4	49.1	79.6
Peru	43.9	3.0	53.1	14.3	42.9	42.8	53.8
Suriname	25.9	6.0	68.1	7.5	27.8	64.7	62.3
Trinidad & Tobago	29.4	8.9	61.7	21.1	19.5	59.4	39.1
US	25.5	1.4	73.2	5.3	10.1	84.6	N/A
Uruguay	24.2	1.1	74.7	7.6	23.1	69.3	77.8
Venezuela	39.2	5.2	55.6	18.6	35.0	46.4	58.3

Notes: Means are adjusted for complex survey sample design. The item on gender quotas was not asked in the U.S. Those who choose responses of 5, 6, or 7 on a 1–7 scale are coded as supporting gender quotas.

Table A2. Women presidential candidates analyzed.

Country	Year of election	Candidate	Party	% of respondents	Actual vote %	Incumbent candidate/ party?	Won?
Argentina	2011	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	Frente para la Victoria/ Partido Justicialista	81.5	54.12	Incumbent candidate	Yes
Brazil	2010	Dilma Rousseff	PT, PMDB, PDT, PCdoB, PSB	68.4	46.91	Incumbent party	Yes
Brazil	2010	Marina Silva	Partido Verde	7.7	19.33	Neither	
Costa Rica	2010	Laura Chinchilla	PLN	68.0	46.90	Incumbent party	Yes
Guatemala	2011	Adela de Torrebiarte	Partido Accion de Desarrollo Nacional	0.4	0.42	Neither	
Guatemala	2011	Patricia de Arzu	Partido Unionista	1.1	2.19	Neither	
Guatemala	2011	Rigoberta Menchu	Winaq/Urng/ann – Frente Amplio	3.0	3.22	Neither	
Haiti	2010/ 2011	Josette Bijou	Independent	0.3	1.00	Neither	
Haiti	2010/ 2011	Mirlande Marigat	RDNP (Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes)	14.3	31.37	Neither	
Panama	2009	Balbina Herrera	Partido Revolucionario Democrático	31.1	37.54	Incumbent party	
Paraguay	2008	Blanca Ovelar	Asociación Nacional Republicana (Partido Colorado)	21.3	30.70	Incumbent party	
Peru	2011	Keiko Fujimori	Fuerza 2011	29.1	23.57	Neither	