

Online Appendix: Incorporating Marginal Citizens and Voters: The Conditional Electoral Effects of Targeted Social Assistance in Latin America

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Appendix Table 1. Multinomial Logit Model Recoding Non-Responders as Abstainers

	Would Not Vote		Would Vote for Opposition		Would Vote Blank/Null	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Received Public Assistance	-0.281***	0.054	-0.145*	0.057	-0.198**	0.076
Government Partisan	-2.566***	0.059	-2.523***	0.070	-2.516***	0.113
Opposition Partisan	-0.647***	0.070	1.317***	0.063	-0.387***	0.106
Perception of National Economy	-0.645***	0.099	-1.008***	0.103	-1.142***	0.140
Perception of Personal Economy	-0.122	0.106	0.019	0.112	-0.110	0.161
Wealth Quintile	-0.007	0.015	0.038*	0.015	-0.003	0.022
Unemployment	-0.039	0.075	0.041	0.081	0.151	0.108
Decline in Income	0.106*	0.046	0.091^	0.048	0.169*	0.068
Bribe Victim	-0.140	0.089	-0.073	0.093	0.131	0.114
Crime Victim	-0.091^	0.050	-0.028	0.052	-0.014	0.065
Effectiveness of Current Administration	-2.027***	0.103	-2.831***	0.110	-2.312***	0.148
Support for State Economic Intervention	-0.315**	0.105	-0.035	0.117	-0.212	0.145
Educational Level	0.033	0.030	0.177***	0.030	0.059	0.045
Woman	0.072*	0.034	0.024	0.038	0.061	0.052
Size of Place of Residence	0.028^	0.015	-0.001	0.016	0.011	0.022
Age	-0.016**	0.006	-0.005	0.006	-0.010	0.009
Age Squared	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Internal Efficacy	-0.350***	0.069	0.012	0.071	-0.200^	0.102
System Support	-0.467***	0.118	-0.080	0.118	-0.944***	0.161
Support for Democracy	0.021	0.070	0.120	0.073	-0.142	0.100
Community Participation	-0.494***	0.092	-0.122	0.093	-0.136	0.136
Constant	2.915***	0.217	1.986***	0.222	1.573***	0.306
<i>Number of Observations</i>	30,048					
<i>F</i>	69.2					

Note: Baseline response is voting for the incumbent. Country fixed effects are included in analysis but omitted from table for ease of presentation. Coefficients are statistically significant at ^ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Appendix Table 2. Logit Models: The Impact of Social Assistance in 9 Countries with Major CCT Programs

	Would Not Vote		Would Vote for Opposition		Would Vote Blank/Null	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Received Public Assistance (Key Ind. Variable)	-0.421*** (0.127)		-0.286* (0.106)		-0.490*** (0.137)	
Beneficiary of Main CCT Program		-0.264* (0.115)		-.307*** (0.100)		-0.345*** (0.130)
Assistance from Other Program (Unspecified)		-0.300 (0.213)		-0.141 (0.166)		-0.511* (0.241)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	7374	7400				

F

*Note: Baseline response is voting for the incumbent. Model is estimated based on Argentina (Asignación Universal por Hijo), Brazil (Bolsa Família), Chile (Programa Chile Solidario), Costa Rica (Avancemos), Dominican Republic (Tarjeta de Solidaridad), Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano), Mexico (Oportunidades program), and Peru (Programa Juntos). Country fixed effects and all independent variables from Table 2 are included in the analysis but omitted from the table for ease of presentation. Coefficients are statistically significant at * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.*

Appendix Table 3. Logistic Regression Models: The Relationship between Social Assistance and the Vote, by Country Type (Effects Presented in Figure 2)

	No Vote		Vote for Opposition		Blank Vote	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Countries with Agency Control of Major Program						
Received Public Assistance	-0.142	0.081	-0.022	0.073	0.013	0.092
<i>Number of Observations</i>	14535					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	13					
<i>F</i>	47.46***					
Countries with Presidential Control						
Received Public Assistance	-0.600***	0.134	-0.493***	0.115	-0.552***	0.155
<i>Number of Observations</i>	7684					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	7					
<i>F</i>	36.04***					
Countries with Centrist/Rightist President						
Received Public Assistance	-0.230*	0.108	-0.118	0.101	-0.290*	0.146
<i>Number of Observations</i>	9684					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	9					
<i>F</i>	37.33***					
Countries with Leftist President						
Received Public Assistance	-0.297***	0.083	-0.147*	0.072	-0.129	0.091
<i>Number of Observations</i>	16105					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	14					
<i>F</i>	51.91***					
Countries with Unconditional/Unenforced Conditional Assistance						
Received Public Assistance	-0.222^	0.133	-0.107	0.101	0.057	0.130
<i>Number of Observations</i>	9322					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	8					
<i>F</i>	37.99***					
Countries with Major Conditional Programs						
Received Public Assistance	-0.291***	0.085	-0.166*	0.082	-0.326**	0.104
<i>Number of Observations</i>	12146					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	11					
<i>F</i>	46.38***					

	No Vote		Vote for Opposition		Blank Vote	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Voluntary/Unenforced Compulsory Voting Countries						
Received Public Assistance	-0.162 [^]	0.087	0.048	0.085	-0.184	0.127
<i>Number of Observations</i>	12640					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	12					
<i>F</i>	37.90***					
Compulsory Voting Countries						
Received Public Assistance	-0.304**	0.101	-0.319***	0.082	-0.201*	0.099
<i>Number of Observations</i>	13149					
<i>Number of Countries</i>	11					
<i>F</i>	53.37***					

Note: Baseline response is voting for the incumbent. Coefficients are statistically significant at [^] p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Controls for partisanship, perception of the personal/national economy, wealth, unemployment, income decline, victimization by bribery and corruption, ratings of the current administration, education, location of residence, age, efficacy, system support, support for democracy, and community participation, as well as country-level fixed effects are included in the analysis but omitted from the presented results.


Appendix Table 4. “Full” Hierarchical Multinomial Logistic Regression Model, with All Cross-Level Interactions

	No Vote		Vote for Opposition		Blank Vote	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
<i>Cross-Level Interactions</i>						
Beneficiary*Leftist President	-0.124	0.170	0.031	0.154	0.320	0.272
Beneficiary*Compulsory Voting	-0.194	0.153	-0.535***	0.138	-0.538*	0.260
Beneficiary*Conditionality	-0.100	0.144	-0.143	0.124	-0.439**	0.165
Beneficiary*Presidential Control	-0.551***	0.168	-0.469***	0.135	-0.483**	0.187
<i>Country-Level Variables</i>						
Leftist President	-0.645	0.609	-0.413	0.356	-0.537	0.569
Compulsory Voting	-0.780	0.610	-0.159	0.356	0.424	0.571
Conditionality Enforced	-0.616	0.552	-0.546	0.322	-0.244	0.515
Presidential Control	0.264	0.564	0.085	0.328	-0.004	0.523
<i>Individual-Level Variables</i>						
Received Public Assistance	0.137	0.188	0.372*	0.167	0.359	0.236
Government Partisan	-2.523***	0.077	-2.523***	0.070	-2.487***	0.107
Opposition Partisan	-0.698***	0.089	1.268***	0.064	-0.364***	0.104
Perception of National Economy	-0.705***	0.117	-0.994***	0.105	-1.230***	0.141
Perception of Personal Economy	-0.051	0.132	0.010	0.119	-0.031	0.159
Wealth Quintile	-0.007	0.018	0.0456**	0.016	0.021	0.021
Unemployment	-0.040	0.098	0.054	0.089	0.206^	0.112
Decline in Income	0.139*	0.056	0.100*	0.051	0.176**	0.066
Bribe Victim	-0.152	0.111	-0.042	0.090	0.163	0.112
Crime Victim	-0.073	0.061	-0.033	0.051	-0.018	0.066
Effectiveness of Current Administration	-2.218***	0.122	-2.838***	0.108	-2.369***	0.142
Support for State Economic Intervention	-0.462***	0.119	-0.080	0.111	-0.260^	0.141
Educational Level	-0.033	0.038	0.157***	0.033	0.054	0.044
Woman	0.125**	0.047	0.047	0.041	0.123*	0.054
Size of Place of Residence	0.021	0.016	0.015	0.014	0.010	0.019
Age	-0.050***	0.008	-0.012^	0.007	-0.017^	0.009
Age Squared	0.000***	0.000	0.000^	0.000	0.000	0.000


	No Vote		Vote for Opposition		Blank Vote	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Internal Efficacy	-0.238**	0.085	0.141^	0.076	-0.157	0.099
System Support	-0.830***	0.132	0.011	0.116	-0.876***	0.152
Support for Democracy	-0.576***	0.088	-0.057	0.081	-0.296**	0.103
Community Participation	-0.722***	0.111	-0.040	0.096	-0.096	0.128
Constant	1.039	0.679	1.003*	0.397	-0.711	0.633
Random Effect						
Standard Deviation	1.099		0.637		1.016	
Variance Component	1.208		0.405		1.033	
Chi-Square	1648.576		750.950		795.740	
Number of observations	21468					
Number of Level 2 observations	19					

Note: Random effects are estimated at the country level. Baseline response is voting for the incumbent. Coefficients are statistically significant at ^ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. All non-dichotomous variables are centered at their country-level means.

Appendix Figure 1. Marginal Effects of CCT Assistance on Hypothetical Electoral Outcomes in Nine Countries with Major CCT Programs (see Footnote 5; compare with Figure 2).



Appendix Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Social Assistance on Hypothetical Electoral Outcomes, for Hierarchical Multinomial Analysis (as presented in Table 3)



Appendix Table 5. Estimated Proportion of Population Receiving Government Assistance for Countries in the 2012 AmericasBarometer Sample

Country	Proportion Receiving Assistance (2012)	Proportion of Total Population Receiving CCT (2010)	Proportion of Total Population in Safety Net Programs (Year)
Argentina	0.147	0.083	0.097 (2010)
Belize	0.092	--	--
Bolivia	0.549	0.175	0.137 (2007)
Brazil	0.195	0.264	0.211 (2009)
Chile	0.147	0.068	0.706 (2009)
Colombia	0.162	0.252	--
Costa Rica	0.154	0.033	0.443 (2009)
DR	0.226	0.212	0.237 (2009)
Ecuador	0.169	0.443	0.614 (2010)
El Salvador	0.106	0.082	0.666 (2009)
Guatemala	0.077	0.226	0.419 (2006)
Guyana	0.199	--	--
Haiti	0.165	--	--
Honduras	0.049	0.087	--
Jamaica	0.202	0.113	--
Mexico	0.159	0.246	0.324 (2010)
Nicaragua	0.077	0.000	0.602 (2005)
Panama	0.094	0.109	0.520 (2008)
Paraguay	0.077	0.086	0.335 (2009)
Peru	0.073	0.076	0.570 (2009)
Suriname	0.223	--	--
T&T	0.195	0.024	--
Uruguay	0.174	0.116	0.422 (2009)
Venezuela	0.082	--	0.047 (2006)

Note: Countries with no data (--).

Sources: Proportion receiving assistance is based on responses to 2012 AmericasBarometer survey question CCT1NEW. Proportion of total population receiving CCT based on Cecchini and Madariaga (2011, pp.103, 177-183). Nicaragua had shut down its CCT program by 2010. Proportion of total population in safety net programs based on the most recent World Development Indicators data available, using the indicator for % Program Participation – All Social Safety Nets.